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I. INTRODUCTION
In many coal producing areas the ownership of the minerals is
separate from the ownership of the surface. Many conveyances sev-
ering these estates released the mineral owner from the duty of pro-
viding subjacent support to the surface or from liability for damage
caused by subsidence. As underground mining technology has ad-
* A.B. 1976, Morehead State University; J.D. 1979, University of Tennessee. From 1983-
1987, Mr. Gresham served with the Virginia Attorney General's office, representing the Common-
wealth's minerals and reclamation agencies. Mr. Gresham is presently an associate in the Abingdon
and Bristol, Virginia law firm of Penn, Stuart, Eskridge and Jones and is engaged in the practice
of mineral and administrative law.
** B.A. 1984, J.D. 1987 University of Kentucky. Mr. Jamison is an associate in the Abingdon
and Bristol, Virginia firm of Penn, Stuart, Eskridge & Jones and is engaged in the practice of mineral
and administrative law.
1
Gresham and Jamison: Do Waivers of Support and Damage Authorize Full Extraction Mining
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
vanced, resulting in total or near total coal extraction, complaints
of subsidence damage appear to be increasing. This has spawned
numerous challenges to the continued validity of waivers of sub-
jacent support by surface owners, public interest groups, scholars,
and law makers.
This article discusses the general law relating to the right of sub-
jacent support and waivers of that right. Specifically, the authors
will focus on (1) recent cases challenging the validity of waivers of
the right of subjacent support, especially as to operations employing
longwall mining, and (2) limitations on these waivers, including leg-
islative action.
II. SUBSIDENCE AND LONGWALL MINING
Subsidence is the downward movement of the earth resulting
from the removal of lower, supporting strata. In coal mining, the
removal of the underlying coal and/or loss of the supporting pillars
or artificial support results in subsidence.' Various factors influence
the type, degree, and timing of subsidence. 2 A full discussion of
these factors is beyond the scope of this article; however, a brief
discussion concerning the effects of particular methods of mining
on subsidence is necessary.
Two types of underground mining techniques exist: (1) methods
resulting in total or near total extraction of the coal seam and (2)
methods resulting in only partial extraction of the seam.3 Room and
pillar mining is by far the most commonly utilized method of un-
derground mining in the United States. 4 This method extracts the
coal by a series of parallel and perpendicular entries or rooms, leav-
ing blocks or pillars of coal to support the roof.5 This type of min-
1. Dahl, Geological and Other Aspects of Subsidence, in 1989 E. MIN. L. FOUND. SPECIAL
INST. ON COAL MInE StSIDENCE 1.01; see Comment, Island Creek v. Rodgers and Mine Subsidence
Liability, 1 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 127, 128 (1985).
2. For a general discussion of these factors, see Dahl, supra note 1; Hunt & Jones, Subsidence
Regulation Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 2 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y.
63, 72-76 (1986).
3. Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 71.
4. Comment, The Common Law Rights to Subjacent Support and Surface Preservation, 38
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ing, without more, results in extraction rates of 35-50% of the seam. 6
While room and pillar mining typically leaves support for the sur-
face, it does not insure the absence of subsidence. In addition, the
passage of time may contribute to the degradation and collapse of
support pillars. Subsidence from abandoned room and pillar mines
can occur within as few as ten and as many as 100 years after
mining,7 although, typically, these subsidence incidents occur 50 or
more years after mining.8
As coal became more valuable, operators looked to ways of in-
creasing the extraction ratio of room and pillar mining. The first
method was to increase the size of the entries or rooms and to
decrease the size of the pillars. 9 Later, operators used a two-step
process of advance and retreat mining. This method develops the
rooms and pillars as the mine advances into the seam of coal. When
the mining advance reaches its limit, the retreat phase begins. In
this phase, the mine extracts the pillars as it retreats. This method,
considered a high or total extraction method, yields an extraction
ratio of 70-95%.10
Longwall mining utilizes the room and pillar method to develop
a large block or panel in the coal seam. Special extraction equipment
then completely removes the panel of coal, which may typically
measure 500 feet or more wide and one-half mile or longer." Hy-
draulic jacks support the roof at the site of extraction and advance
along with the extraction machinery. As the jacks and equipment
advance, the mine roof may collapse into the void created. The
extraction ratio of this method of mining is virtually 100%.12
Extraction of coal by either longwall mining or room and pillar
mining with full pillar removal, in virtually all instances, results in
6. Dahl, supra note 1, at 1.02.
7. Id. at 1.05; Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 76.
8. Dahl, supra note 1, at 1.05.
9. Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 71-72.
10. Id. at 72; Dahl, supra note 1, at 1.02-1.03.
11. Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 72 n.36.
12. Id. at 72; Dahl, supra note 1, at 1.03.
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measurable subsidence. 3 Typically, 90% of the subsidence occurs
within three months of the extraction process. 14
Subsidence resulting from mining will occur as one of two types.
Room and pillar mining, at shallow depths, can result in "sink-
holes.' 1 5 The failure of the roof either above an entry or room or
at an intersection of entries creates the sinkholes.' 6 The other major
type of subsidence is known as "trough" or sag subsidence." This
subsidence normally involves full or high extraction mining tech-
niques such as room and pillar mining with complete pillar extraction
and longwall mining.' 8 It also may involve mining at deeper depths. 9
As the intervening strata cave into the void or fracture and bend,
a sag or trough results in the surface, causing a lowering in elevation
of the surface.20
III. RIGHT OF SUBIACENT SUPPORT
Ownership of the surface of the land and of the minerals or
underlying strata can be severed and vested in multiple owners. 2'
This severance often creates conflicts between surface owners and
mineral owners in the exercise of their respective rights. In the first
half of the nineteenth century, the English courts established that
the surface of the land must be supported in its natural state by
the underlying mineral estate. 22 Courts have held this right to sub-
jacent support to be absolute. That is, removal of the subjacent
support subjects the mineral owner to liability without proof of neg-
13. Hunt & Jones, supra note 2, at 72.
14. Id.; Dahl, supra note 1, at 1.03.






21. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 72 Am. Dec. 760 (1858); List v. Cotts, 4 W.
Va. 543 (1871); Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 75 Ohio St. 493, 80 N.E. 6 (1907); Scott v. Laws,
185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919); Bostic v. Bostic, 199 Va. 348, 99 S.E.2d 591, 66 A.L.R.2d 971
(1957).
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ligence. 23 The right of subjacent support also exists without reference
to the nature of the strata or the comparative values of the two
estates or without consideration of the difficulty of supporting the
surface.2 However, the surface owner may waive or release sub-
jacent support expressly or, in some situations, by implication.25
The right of subjacent support arose from and, in most respects,
is similar to the right of lateral support.26 Lateral support requires
property to support and be supported by adjoining property. 27 In
lateral support, the division of property is by a vertical plane while
subjacent support is divided horizontally.28
A. Nature of the Right of Subjacent Support
Several theories have been advanced as to the origin of the right
of support, either subjacent or lateral. One theory defines the right
as exjure naturae-a "natural" right. 29 A second theory applies the
doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.3 0 Under that doc-
trine, if mining will result in damage to the surface, sufficient sup-
port must be left or artificial supports must be provided by the
mineral owner. 31 A third theory classifies the right of subjacent sup-
port as an easerfent.32 Under this theory the mineral estate and the
right to mine are subservient to the surface owner's right to perpetual
support of the surface in its natural condition. Advanced as a fourth
theory is the notion that the right is not in the nature of an easement
23. E.g., 5 PoWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 703, at 311 (1968); 1 Am. JuR. 2d Adjoining Land-
owners § 78 (1962); Comment, supra note 4, at 238; Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255
(1901); Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N.E. 959 (1909); Stonegap Colliery Co. v.
Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916); West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dilback, 219 Ky. 783, 294
S.W. 478 (1927); Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 Ill. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285 (1943).
24. 1 AM. JuR. 2d, Adjoining Landowners § 78 (1962).
25. See, e.g., VIA AmERcAN LAw OP PROPERTY, Right's Incident to Possession of Land §
28.38 (1954); 1 AM. JuR. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 88 (1962); 54 AM. JuR. 2d Mines and Minerals
§ 203 (1971); 5 Powaa, supra note 23, 703, at 315-16; Comment, supra note 4, at 241.
26. 5 POWELL, supra note 23, 703, at 311.
27. 1 AM. JuR. 2d, Adjoining Landowners § 37 (1962).
28. Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface in Mining
Operations, 6 RocKY MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 497, 498 (1961).
29. Comment, supra note 4, at 239.
30. Id. ("so use your property as not to injure the rights of another").
31. See, e.g., Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916).
32. Comment, supra note 4, at 239; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q.B. at 742.
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but is part of the freehold itself.33 It is a proprietary right and a
part of the realty just as is the surface soil and the minerals.3 4 Fi-
nally,in Pennsylvania, the right of subjacent support is an inde-
pendent estate in land separate from the surface or the underlying
strata.3 5
As the doctrines of subjacent and lateral support developed, one
major difference arose. Originally, the absolute right of support ex-
tended only to the supported property in its natural condition.36
Generally, to be awarded damages for injuries to improvements,
buildings, and structures, it was necessary to prove negligence on
the part of the owner of the supporting estate in removing the sup-
port.37 A mineral owner could avoid liability for removal of support
by showing that, without the structures or improvements, the surface
would not have been damaged. 8
While generally the law of lateral support has retained this dis-
tinction between the surface in the natural state and the improve-
ments, subjacent support decisions have held that the weight of
structures is normally insignificant relative to the weight of the su-
33. Comment, supra note 4, at 239.
34. Id.
35. Chartnetski v. Miners Mill Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921). This theory
appears to be related to the fourth proprietary right theory. It can result in an interesting situation
where the surface, minerals, and support estates are owned by separate persons. While the mineral
owner could not remove support without being liable for any resulting damage, the surface owner
would have no cause of action having no right to support. The owner of the support estate, while
potentially having a claim, has no damages. See 5 POWELL, supra note 23, 703, at 316-316.1; R.
DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAs IN WEST VIRGO1A AND VIRoINIA § 29, at 36 (1951). This
situation is not limited solely to Pennsylvania and its support estate position. If the owner of the fee
conveys the surface reserving the minerals and the right to remove support without liability for damage
and then leases the minerals to a third party with a provision that mining shall not remove support,
a similar situation occurs. The surface owner may have an argument that he is a third-party beneficiary
under the lease or that the lessor of the minerals holds the right to support in a constructive trust
for a surface owner. See Id. at 34-38; Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 W. Va. 900, 62 S.E.2d
337 (1950).
36. 5 POWELL, supra note 23, 699, at 285-86.
37. Id., 700, at 292.
38. Id. The operation of this rule can change through the conduct of the parties. Support for
the improvements or additions may be expressly granted, granted by implication through a common
predecessor in title, or by the nature and use of the property. English law has recognized that lateral
support for buildings and other improvements may be acquired by prescription. See Brown v. Robins,
157 Eng. Rep. 809 (1859). The American courts have not followed this rule of prescription. See
Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1 (1885).
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perincumbent strata. 39 Therefore, the burden of proof is on the min-
eral owner to show that the weight of the structure caused or
contributed to the subsidence. 40 Because this is a nearly impossible
burden, courts normally find that the surface would have subsided
regardless of the structures.4' Thus, courts award consequential dam-
ages for injury to structures based on the breach of the absolute
duty to support the surface in its natural condition.42 Some courts
have found that the natural state of the surface includes contem-
plated and foreseeable uses at the time of the severance. 43 In Island
Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers," the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
interpreted "natural state" as the condition of the surface, including
contemplated and foreseeable improvements at the time of the sev-
erance of the mineral from the earth, not the severance of the estate.45
By definition, the right of support is absolute. 46 However, it is
absolute only to the extent that the mineral owner is liable for the
direct consequences of the removal regardless of the care utilized,
the coal operator's lack of negligence, or mining customs in the
area. 47 The right of support does not make the mineral estate owner
an insurer of the natural condition of the surface. 48
Some courts have relied upon this absolute right of support, in
both subjacent and lateral support cases, to justify injunctive relief
against mining or excavation activities even in the absence of ir-
reparable damage, 49 and despite the end result being permanent ces-
39. 5 POWELL, supra note 23, 703, at 312; Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (1880).




43. Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke National Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923);
Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497 (1908); see also Annotation, Liability of
Mine Operator for Damage to Surface Structure by Removal of Support, 32 A.L.R. 2d 1309, 1315
(1953).
44. 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
45. Id. at 344.
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. 54 AM. JuR. 2d, Mines and Minerals § 200 (1971).
48. VIA AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.39, at 111 n.7 (citing Carrig v.
Andrews, 127 Conn. 403, 17 A.2d 520 (1941) (discussing lateral support)).
49. Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. 107 (N. D. Ill. 1918); Trow-
bridge v. True, 52 Conn. 190, 52 Am. Rep. 570 (1884); McGurn v. Reichel, 268 S.W. 399 (Mo. App.
1925); VIA AmERicAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.53, at 153.
1990]
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sation of the operations.50 However, in Large v. Clinchfield Coal
Company,51 the Virginia Supreme Court held that in the absence of
appreciable damage, either caused or threatened to the surface, the
absolute right of support would not justify an injunction to halt a
longwall mining operation. 52 In the face of plaintiffs' contention that
the absolute right of support gave rise to a cause of action for any
subsidence, the court stated, "the 'absolute' nature of the right to
subjacent support merely implies strict liability for its violation."53
Analogizing the right of subjacent support to lateral support, the
court found that without damage being shown to the adjoining prop-
erty, no cause of action for removal of lateral support could be
maintained.5 4 Similarly, because no appreciable damage had been
shown by the surface owners, the court did not find a violation of
their right of subjacent support.5
B. Waiver or Release of the Right of Subjacent Support
While it has been held that the right of subjacent support exists
in the ownership of the property without the necessity of contract, 6
the owner of the surface estate may waive the right by agreement
with the owner of the mineral estate.57 A waiver of the right of
support must either be by express language or by implication, if the
language clearly and unequivocally shows the intention of the par-
ties.5 8
50. Marquette Cement Mining Co., 253 F. at 107; Trowbridge, 52 Conn. at 190, 52 AM. REP.
at 570; VIA AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.53, at 153.
51. 239 Va. 144, 387 S.E.2d 783 (1990).
52. Id. at 786.
53. Id. at 785 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 820 comment b (1977)).
54. Id. at 786.
55. Id. at 786. The trial court found after hearing testimony that no material damage would
occur to the Large's surface property, despite finding that the elevation of the surface would be
lowered by approximately three feet. Id. at 785.
56. 1 AM. JuR. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 37, at 717 (1971); Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q.B.
739 (1850); Comment, supra note 4, at 237.
57. Comment, supra note 4, at 237.
58. 54 AM. JUR. 2d, Mines and Minerals § 203 (1971); 6A AmERicAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra
note 25, § 28.38, at 104-07; Comment, supra note 4, at 242; see Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320
Ill. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285, 287 (1943); Rush v. Sines Bros. & Co., 34 Ohio App. 38, 45, 170
N.E. 379, 381 (1929).
[Vol. 92
8




A waiver of subjacent support by express contractual language
can occur in one of three ways. First, the owner of the property
may grant the minerals and the right to remove the minerals without
leaving sufficient support for the surface.5 9 No doubt remains that
the surface is not required to be supported by the underlying strata.
Secondly, the owner may grant the surface, reserving the minerals
and expressly providing that the right of subjacent support does not
attach to the surface. 6 The third method is by subsequent document,
whereby the owner of the surface estate releases the right of sub-
jacent support to the owner or operator of the mineral estate. 61
As the right of subjacent support runs with the supported estate
through successive ownerships, a waiver of the right runs with the
supporting estate. 62 The surface owner cannot abandon or extinguish
the waiver on the theory of prescription. Nor should the surface
owner recover on an estoppel theory because of the potentially severe
damage which may occur to the surface. 63 Courts have upheld waiv-
ers of the right of subjacent support against arguments that the
waivers are contrary to public policy. 64 This is true even though the
effect of such waiver is to permanently destroy the use of the sur-
face. 65
2. Implied Waivers
Though some jurisdictions have held that the right of subjacent
support may be waived or released by necessary implication, courts
59. Comment, supra note 4, at 241 (citing Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88
N.E. 959 (1909); Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 138
S.E. 737 (1927)).
60. Comment, supra note 4, at 241 (citing Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63,
61 A. 559 (1905)).
61. Chartnetski v. Miner's Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921); R. DoNLEY,
supra note 35, at 36; Comment, supra note 4, at 242.
62. VIA AmERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.38, at 105-06.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 107; Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1982); Mason
v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 II. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285 (1943); Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co., 267
Pa. 425, 110 A. 298 (1920); Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va.
44, 138 S.E. 737 (1927).
65. Peabody Coal Co., 320 Ill. App. at 350, 51 N.E.2d at 285; Continental Coal Co. v. Con-
nellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. at 44, 138 S.E. at 737; VIA AvmRicAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 25, § 23.38, at 107.
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are reluctant to imply such waivers. 66 Therefore, for the right of
subjacent support to be waived by implication, the language must
be clear, unequivocal, and free from ambiguity.67
In Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 18 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that a grant of all the coal with a right to
mine and remove all the coal releases the right of subjacent support
by necessary implication. 69 While this rule of construction has been
upheld and affirmed as a rule of property in West Virginia in sub-
sequent decisions, 70 the court has narrowly construed it. For ex-
ample, the grant of all the coal with the right to remove "such
coal" does not operate to release the right of subjacent support. 7'
Without the use of the phrase "all the coal" in the grant of mining
rights, the court would not find an implied waiver of the subjacent
support. 72 No other jurisdiction has adopted or followed this rule. 73
Several other jurisdictions have held that a grant or reservation
of the minerals and the right to remove the minerals without liability
for resulting damages waives the right of subjacent support by im-
plication. 74 Those cases have found that the intention of the parties
was to allow removal of all the coal without the necessity of leaving
sufficient support for the surface.75 Any other construction would
change the plain and unambiguous meaning of the words used. 76
66. VIA AmEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.38, at 107; 54 AM JuR. 2d, Mines
and Minerals § 203 (1971); Comment, supra note 4, at 241.
67. Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (1880); Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Stonegap
Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916); Comment, supra note 4, at 242.
68. 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905).
69. Id.
70. Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co., 177 S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1970); Simmers v. Star
Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 167 S.E. 737 (1933).
71. Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 58, 108 S.E. 491, 492 (1921).
72. Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va. 387, 390, 59 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1950); see also
Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950); R. DONLEY, supra note 35, at 209-10.
73. Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N.E. 959 (1909); Stonegap Colliery Co.,
119 Va. at 271, 89 S.E. at 305; VIA AmmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.38, at 108
n.20; Twitty, supra note 28, at 502.
74. Peabody Coal Co., 320 Il. App. at 350, 51 N.E.2d at 285; Paull, 44 Ind. App. at 218,
88 N.E. at 959; Rush v. Sines Bros. & Co., 34 Ohio App. 38, 170 N.E. 379 (1929); Atherton v.
Clearview Coal Co., 267 Pa. 425, 110 A. 298 (1920); Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 83 A. 478
(Pa. 1912); Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63, 61 A. 559 (Pa. 1905).
75. Id.
76. See Paull, 44 Ind. App. at 221, 88 N.E. at 961; Rush, 34 Ohio App. at 43, 170 N.E. at
[Vol. 92
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However, a waiver of damages contained in a conveyance does
not necessarily waive the right of subjacent support.77 Courts have
found neither the grant or reservation of coal with certain enu-
merated mining rights nor the waiver of damages resulting from the
proper exercise of those rights to waive subjacent support.78 A dis-
cussion of other examples of language that were held sufficient and
insufficient to waive subjacent support follows below.79
Because the waiver of support runs with the supporting estate
through successive ownerships, 80 any subsequent owner may mine
and remove the coal without leaving sufficient support and without
liability for damages to the surface.8" Owners of those rights and
immunities may grant them to lessees as owners of an interest in
the mineral estate. 82 It would then follow that a contract miner for
either the mineral owner or a mineral lessee would also be entitled
to those rights and privileges subject to contractual limitations.
However, in Johnson v. Junior Pocahontas Coal Co. Inc.,83 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held the opposite. Relying
upon a strained distinction between privity of contract and privity
of estate, the court held that a contract mine operator was not nec-
essarily entitled to the mineral owner's right to remove all of the
coal without liability to the surface owner for damages.84
77. Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. at 497, 83 A. at 479; Dignan v. Altoona Coal
& Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909); Comment, supra note 4, at 243-44.
78. Stilley, 234 Pa. at 497, 83 A. at 479.
79. Sufficient: Sheker v. Jensen. 241 Iowa 583, 41 N.W.2d 679
(1950) (Liquidated damages in conveyance for land used with right to mine without liability for
damage, held that liquidated damage clause was for both land used and damaged.); see Culp v.
Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., No. 87-1688 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
file). Insufficient: Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 Ill. App. 85 (1909) (Grant of minerals with
direction to do as little damage to surface as possible.); Hines v. Union Connellsville Coke Co., 271
Pa. 219, 114 A. 521 (1921) (Grant of coal with usual mining rights and privileges.); Lenox Coal Co.
v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 265 Pa. 572, 109 A. 282 (1920) (Right to mine in the most economical
method and in accordance with state law.); Drummond v, White Oak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va. 368,
140 S.E. 57 (1927) (Assignment of right to use parts of the surface to mine underlying minerals.).
80. VIA Aims uc LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.38 at 105.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 160 W. Va. 261, 234 S.E.2d 309 (1977).
84. Id. at 271-74, 234 S.E.2d 314-16. This case was before the court on the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Additionally, allegations of willful and wanton conduct had been made by
plaintiffs. This potentially would have taken the case outside of the protection of the waiver. See
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3. What Is Waived?
Once it has been determined that the right of subjacent support
has been waived, questions arise as to exactly what is waived. As
stated earlier, the right of subjacent support is absolute; proof of
negligence on the part of the mineral owner or operator is not nec-
essary to establish entitlement to damages. 5 Some early cases held
that the waiver only waived the right to recover for damages without
proof of negligence. 6 However, other cases have held that the waiver
applies to all damages whether under the theories of strict liability
or negligence. 87 Some courts, in dicta, have left open the question
as to whether or not a waiver of subjacent support, either express
or implied, would insulate the mineral owner or operator from dam-
ages caused by willful or wanton action or intentional torts.8 8 In
Kentucky, it would appear that a waiver does not insulate the min-
eral owner from arbitrary, wanton or malicious actions or gross
negligence .89
Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co., 154 W. Va. 578, 177 S.E.2d 146 (1970); Continental Coal
Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 138 S.E. 737 (1927). The defendant was
also engaged in strip mining which the court found to be at odds with the plaintiff's surface property
rights and uses. However, the court made much of the lack of privity of estate between the defendant
and the lessee of the mineral estate without explaining adequately how such a lack deprived the
defendant of the benefit of the waiver. Justice Neely in a dissenting opinion castigated the majority
for sidestepping the true issue as he saw it: whether the continued effect of exculpatory clauses such
as in the conveyance before the court should be allowed. See Johnson, 160 W. Va. at 274-83, 234
S.E.2d at 316-20 (Neely, J., dissenting). However, in his dissent, Justice Neely reasoned that the lack
of privity of estate did not bar the defendant from claiming the benefit of the exculpatory provision.
See id.
85. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
86. See VIA AainPc~A LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 25, § 28.38 at 106 n.9.
87. Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 61 A. 559 (1905); Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co.,
265 Pa. 425, 110 A. 298 (1920); Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 I11. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285
(1943); Republic Steel Corp. v. Payne, 272 Ala. 483, 132 So. 2d 581 (1961); Stamp v. Windsor Power
House Coal Co., 154 W. Va. 578, 177 S.E.2d 146 (1970) (waiver of damage applied even if damage
caused by gross negligence).
88. Eastwood Lands. Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164, 169 (Ala. 1982). But cf. Holmes
v. Alabama Title Company, Inc., 507 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987). (Plaintiffs sued on the grounds of
negligence, wantonness, trespass and nuisance. However, the Alabama Supreme Court found plaintiffs'
actions barred by the waiver of damages. Eastwood Lands was cited as authority for barring all claims
in face of a waiver even for willful or wanton conduct.). See also Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville
By-Product Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 51, 138 S.E. 737, 742 (1927). Atherton, 267 Pa. at 424, 110
A. at 300 (Simpson, J., concurring).
89. Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Ky. 1952). In early cases, it was
recognized that the surface owner had an absolute right to support from the mineral estate. See, e.g.,
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A waiver of subjacent support does not necessarily waive lateral
support. Nor does a waiver of lateral support necessarily waive sub-
jacent support. In Scranton Coal Co. v. Graff Furnace Co.,90 a
surface owner was unable to recover for damages to his property
allegedly caused by the removal of subjacent support, on the grounds
that right of subjacent support had been expressly waived. However,
the surface owner was able to maintain an action in federal court
for damages from removal of lateral support. The severance deed
reserved the minerals with the right to remove the minerals,
as well as the right of passage through or under the granted surface, to mine
and remove the coal and minerals from any other lands ... without thereby
incurring, in any event whatever, any liability for injury caused or damage done
to the surface of said lot or to the buildings or improvements which now or
hereafter may be put thereon. 9'
West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dilback, 219 Ky. 783, 294 S.W. 478 (1927). Courts also enforced waivers
of surface support against surface owners, with the limitation that the mineral owner could not exercise
its rights in an arbitrary, wanton, malicious or grossly negligent manner. Elkhorn Coal, 249 S.W.2d
at 746. In a series of cases, the Kentucky courts held that under "broad form deeds" the surface
was subservient to the mineral estate. See Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 1183, 1186
(6th Cir. 1974). The cases allowed the mineral owner to extract coal by strip mining methods, even
though strip mining was not mentioned in the deeds nor was strip mining a known process at the
time of the severance of the estates. See generally Barton v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d
395 (Ky. 1968); Buchanan v. Watson. 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). Generally, broad form deeds con-
tained a grant of the coal and all other minerals and then contained a long litany of various rights
the mineral owner would have in the surface. See Pfeiffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law-
Is It Constitutional?, I J. Mit. L. & PoL'y., 57, 58 (1985). Many of the broad form deeds contained
express waivers of subjacent support or waivers of damages for removal of support. However, none
of the cases dealt with removal of subjacent support or subsidence damages. While imposing the
condition that the mineral could not act arbitrarily, oppressively, wantonly, or maliciously, the court
continually held that the mineral owner could utilize strip mining methods without the payment of
damages. Finally, in Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987), the Kentucky Supreme Court,
in a plurality opinion, found that mineral owners under "broad form deeds" could continue to utilize
strip mining methods but would be required to pay the surface owner damages unless "the conveyance
expressly sets out the methods of mining that may be employed and a waiver of damages from the
use of such methods." Id. at 305. This language would appear to specifically cover waivers of subjacent
support or damages for removal of support. It would also appear to remedy a paradox noted by
Justice Stephenson who concurred in part and dissented in part in Akers. Justice Stephenson noted
that under the "broad form deed" cases, the surface owner could have absolute right to have his
surface supported by the mineral owner yet at the same time have the entire surface destroyed by
the mineral owner by strip mining. Id. at 314 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
90. 289 F. 305 (3rd Cir. 1923). In Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 266 F. 798 (3rd
Cir. 1920), the court held that res judicata did not apply to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court since the allegations of damage due to removal of lateral support were not litigated nor were
they before the state courts.
91. 266 F. at 803. The surface owner additionally released and discharged the mineral estate
owner from any liability for injuries to the surface or improvements from the "removal of said coal
or other minerals." Id. at 804.
1990]
13
Gresham and Jamison: Do Waivers of Support and Damage Authorize Full Extraction Mining
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Reasoning that the coal and minerals excepted and reserved were
beneath the surface property conveyed, the court held the waiver
of surface support applied only to vertical or subjacent support, not
to lateral support. 92
IV. RECENT WAIVER LITIGATION
Although courts have historically upheld and strictly enforced
waivers of subjacent support and liability according to their terms,
surface owners have recently attacked the waivers on numerous
fronts. The surface owners have based their challenges on public
policy arguments, regulatory interpretations9 and various legal the-
ories of liability. Additionally, scholars, 94 public interest groups, 95
and damaged surface owners96 have increasingly questioned the va-
lidity of longwall mining under early severance deeds waiving sup-
port and damages. With one notable exception, 97 courts have
continued to uphold waivers in the modern era.
A. Waivers of Support and Damages
In Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co.,91 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals construed the effect of language in a
severance deed that granted a particular seam of coal and waived
both support for the overlying strata and liability for damages to
the overlying strata resulting from the mining.99 Claiming extensive
92. 289 F. at 308.
93. A discussion of recent subsidence-related regulatory challenges to mining operations, par-
ticularly longwall mining, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the reader is directed to Citizens
Against Longwalling v. Division of Reclamation, 41 Ohio App. 3d 290, 535 N.E.2d 687 (1987); George
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 102 Pa. Commw. 87, 517 A.2d 578 (1986).
94. See, e.g., McGinley, Does The Right To Mine Coal Under Lease or Deed Include The
Right To Extract By Longwall Mining Methods?, 5 E. MiN. L. FOUND. 5-1 (1984).
95. See supra note 1.
96. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
97. Melvin v. Old Ben Coal Co., 610 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Ill. 1985), on reconsideration, 612
F. Supp. 1204 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
98. 154 W. Va. 578, 177 S.E.2d 146 (1970).
99. Id. at 579, 177 S.E.2d at 147. The deed granted:
All the Pittsburgh Number Eight or River Vein of coal underlying [the described property]
* . together with all the rights and privileges necessary and useful in the mining and removal
of said coal, including the right of mining the same with or without leaving any support
for the overlying strata, and without liability for any injury which may result to such
overlying strata or to the surface, or to water courses or roads or ways by reason of the
mining and removal of said coal ....
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damage to their property, the surface owners brought suit alleging
"gross, willful and wanton negligence" on the part of the coal com-
pany.110 Upon denying the company's motion for summary judgment
based on the waivers, the circuit court certified questions of whether
the waivers barred damage claims under theories of strict liability,
negligence and gross negligence. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals answered each question in the affirmative. Noting the
long history of litigation concerning waivers of subjacent support
in West Virginia, the court held that the express waivers clearly
barred the strict liability claim. Similarly, relying on earlier decisions,
the court held that the waivers precluded recovery for negligence.
Finally, the court refused to distinguish between "negligence" and
"gross negligence," finding this distinction "too vague and shadowy
to be of any practical importance."'' 01 Hence, the deed language
barring claims under a theory of negligence would similarly bar a
claim of gross negligence. However, the court noted that it merely
considered whether the waivers precluded recovery for negligence.
In dicta, the court indicated it would not uphold a waiver of support
and damages in the face of willful and wanton acts on the part of
the mineral producer. 02
Despite its dicta in Stamp, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals upheld waivers against allegations of willful and wanton
conduct in Rose v. Oneida Coal Co., Inc.'03 There, the surface own-
ers alleged that "Oneida 'willfully, negligently and wantonly' caused
their water supply to disappear and their land to subside."' 4 In
addition to compensatory damages for injury to their property, the
surface owners sought to recover for mental anguish and demanded
punitive damages. The 1915 severance deed construed in Rose re-
served the right to remove support and waived liability for injuries
to the surface. °5
100. Id. at 581, 177 S.E.2d at 148.
101. Id. at 585, 177 S.E.2d at 150.
102. Id.
103. 375 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1988).
104. Id. at 815.
105. Id. at n.1. The deed granted:
... the right to enter upon and under said land to mine and remove all of the said coal
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Again noting a long line of decisions upholding waivers of li-
ability for subsidence damage, the court affirmed the entry of sum-
mary judgment on all common law claims. However, the court noted
that the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act
may give rise to a statutory claim and indicated in dicta that the
Act and its regulations "changed many of the old common law rules
concerning the rights and remedies of surface owners vis a vis min-
eral owners."1 0 6
In Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,107 the Alabama
Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment in favor of the mineral
owner in a suit alleging strict liability, negligent mining and violation
of public policy. The severance deed reserved the right to mine the
coal without leaving support for or preventing damages to the sur-
face.108 The deed also stated that the reservation created a covenant
running with the land.
Observing that the right to subjacent support is absolute unless
expressly waived, the court enforced the express waiver in the deed
to bar the surface owners' theories of strict liability and negligence.
As to the public policy claim, the court found that the surface own-
ers' position ignored constructive notice of matters in recorded deeds,
and further held that to find for the surface owners would deprive
the mineral owner of its property without due process of law.' °9
In Holmes v. Alabama Title Co., Inc.,110 the Alabama Supreme
Court again reviewed a summary judgment entered in favor of the
mineral owner. There, 128 surface owners brought suit against the
under the tract . . without being liable for any injury to said land, or to any thing [sic]
therein or thereon, by reason of the mining and removal of said coal therefrom, and the
coal from neighboring lands, without being required to provide for the overlying strata or
surface.
106. Id. at 816 (discussing W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-1 to -3-40 (1985 repl. vol.)).
107. 417 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1982).
108. Id. at 168. The deed reserved "the right.., to mine and remove the coal and other minerals
contained in said land without leaving supports necessary for sustaining the surface of said land or
for preventing damages thereto . ... "
109. Id. at 169. The court noted that its holding was limited to the facts of the case before it
and specifically did not express an opinion on the applicability of waivers to intentional torts or
"unreasonable uses of the estate reserved."
110. 507 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987).
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mineral owner and five title insurance companies. The 1943 sev-
erance deed construed in Holmes reserved the right to remove the
coal without leaving support or preventing damage to the surface."'
Like the deed in Eastwood Lands, the deed in Holmes also stated
that the rights retained would constitute a covenant running with
the land.
The surface owners in Holmes resided in a subdivision overlying
the mine." 2 Claiming damages under theories of negligence, wan-
tonness, trespass and nuisance, they contended that the exculpatory
provisions in the severance deed did not bar actions predicated under
these theories. The court held that its earlier decision in Eastwood
Lands was not limited to negligence actions. Finding that the waiver
unambiguously barred any and all claims arising from mining ac-
tivities, the court held that even if landowners could provide evidence
of nuisance, trespass or negligent, willful and wanton mining, the
unambiguous deed language barred any such claim."3
B. Waivers Applied to Longwall Mining
While the Alabama and West Virginia courts have upheld waivers
of support and damages against various common law claims for
subsidence-related damages, other jurisdictions have recently ad-
dressed the particular application of waivers of support and damages
to longwall mining. In addition to the policy arguments and common
law damage theories used to attack waivers in general, surface own-
ers have objected to the application of waivers to longwall mining
on grounds that this form of extraction and its resulting damages
could not have been contemplated by the parties at the time of the
severance.
I 11. Id. at 923. The deed stated:
... no right of action for damages on account of injuries to the land above-described or
to any buildings, improvements, structures, wells or water courses ... resulting from past
or future mining operations ... or resulting from removal of coal and other minerals or
coal seam roof supports ... shall ever accrue to or be asserted by the grantee herein ....
Id.
112. Mining beneath the subdivision had terminated shortly before the surface owners began
buying their properties.
113. 507 So. 2d at 925.
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In Wells v. American Electric Power Co., n 4 the Ohio Court of
Appeals construed severance deeds of 1958 and 1959 that conveyed
the right to mine underground without liability for damages." 5 The
surface owners sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief,
arguing that the damage waivers did not include subsidence damages
and that the parties did not contemplate the use of modern longwall
mining at the time of the severance. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the coal company. Addressing the argument
that the waiver of damages did not include damages from subsi-
dence, the court found 'that the deed obviously contemplated un-
derground mining. Noting that the deed neither authorized strip
mining nor allowed any specific surface use, the court'found sub-
sidence damage was the "most obvious" and "most likely" damage
to arise and thus must have been contemplated.1 1 6
Additionally, the court looked to earlier decisions construing the
right to subjacent support and noted that, without waivers, the owner
of the mineral estate would be liable to the surface owner for any
damage resulting from the removal of subjacent support regardless
of the care exercised in that removal.11 7 Applying the waiver to this
rule of law, the court stated "[i]f the grantee of the mineral estate
is liable for all damages, and if grantor waives all damages, it cannot
be contended that the language of the contract is unclear. All means
all.'',18
Turning to the surface owners' argument that the parties did not
contemplate longwall mining at the time of the severance, the court
stated that "the longwall mining process, as such, is only relevant
here to the extent it contributes to subsidence. '" 1 9 The court found
implicit in previous subsidence cases the proposition that the removal
of support causes subsidence. Because the possibility of subsidence
114. 48 Ohio App. 3d 95, 548 N.E.2d 995 (1988).
115. Id., 548 N.E.2d at 996 (The deed granted "[t]he right to mine and remove the said coal
by underground mining processes" and waived "all damages in any manner arising from the mining
and removal of the coal.").
116. Id., 548 N.E.2d at 999.
117. Id., 548 N.E.2d at 997-98 (citing Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Ohio
Collieries v. Cocke, 107 Ohio St. 238 (1923)).
118. Id., 548 N.E.2d at 998.
119. Id., 548 N.E.2d at 999.
[Vol. 92
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/5
WAIVERS OF SUPPORT
damages was known, the court found it was contemplated and ad-
dressed. The court also noted that the plural "underground mining
processes" mentioned in the deed supported the use of modern un-
derground mining techniques. 120
The issues raised before the Ohio court in Wells were brought
before the U.S. District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania
in Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co.12 1 There, the surface owners
sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages under
counts for negligence, intentional trespass, conversion and nuisance.
The severance deeds in question, dated 1900 and 1901, conveyed the
right to remove the coal and waived damages caused by the removal
of the coal.122 The owners of the surface and superjacent coal seams
argued that modern longwall mining could not have been contem-
plated under the severance deeds, that the deeds did not waive sup-
port for other coal seams, and that the deeds should be construed
most strongly against the grantee, who drafted them.
Finding the language unambiguous, the court held the deeds
clearly waived support for both the overlying coal and the surface.
Moreover, the court found that the surface owners offered no ev-
idence to buttress their contention that the grantee drafted the deeds.
120. Id.
121. No. 88-3637 (W.D. Pa. August 8, 1988) aff'd, 870 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1989) (decision
reported without a published opinion).
122. Id., slip op. at 5-6. The deeds involved stated:
... together with the free and uninterrupted right of way into, upon and under said land
at such points and in such manner as may be proper and necessary for the purpose of
digging, mining, draining and ventilating and carrying away, and coaking [sic] said coal
(hereby waiving all surface damages, or damages of any sort arising therefrom, or from
the removal of all of said coal,) ... together with said coal appurtenant thereto the full
and uninterrupted right of way into and under the said land at such points and in such
manner as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of digging, mining and transporting
said coal, and the privileges and easements necessary for the convenient draining, ventilating,
depositing waste and operating the mines, without liability for damages that might arise
from the removal of all of said coal without leaving support for the land above that coal
... together with the free and uninterrupted right of way into, upon, and under each and
both of said tracts of land at such points and in such manner as may be proper and necessary
for the purpose of digging, mining, coaking and carrying away said coal, hereby waiving
all damages arising therefrom or from the removal of all of said coal ....
Porter v. Consolidation Coal Co., Brief of Appellee at 6-7.
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Hence, the narrow issue for discussion was whether longwall mining
was permitted under the provisions of the deeds.123
The surface owners relied on Stewart v. Chernicky'2A to support
their proposition that the parties could not have contemplated long-
wall mining at the time the severance deeds were executed. In Ste-
wart, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a deed
including the language "a full release of and without liability for
damages for injury to the surface, waters or otherwise arising from
any of said operations . "..,,2 did not allow the operator to utilize
strip mining methods. Based on the language of the deed, taken as
a whole, the court held that the parties contemplated only under-
ground, not strip mining. The court focused on deed language grant-
ing "the right to drain and ventilate said mines by shafts or otherwise
" . .,"1' and held that draining and ventilating mines were features
applicable to underground mining. 27 The comparison of longwall
mining to strip mining did not persuade the Porter court. It found,
as a matter of fact, that "longwall mining is not similar to strip
mining in the sense asserted by the plaintiffs."'' 28 Further, finding
the deed to be unambiguous in waiving support and damages, and
finding that the language in the deeds did not suggest an intention
to restrict the form of underground mining employed, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the mineral owner. 129
In Culp v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co.,1 30 decided approxi-
mately nine months after Porter, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania again upheld an operator's right to utilize
longwall technology under severance deeds waiving support and
123. Porter, slip op. at 7-8. The court noted the parties' agreement that Pennsylvania statutory
provisions governing subsidence and subsidence-related damages were not applicable, and hence were
not addressed.
124. 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
125. Id. at 49, 266 A.2d at 263.
126. Id. at 50, 266 A.2d at 263.
127. Id. at 52, 266 A.2d at 264.
128. Porter, slip op. at 8.
129. Id. In a "Not for Publication" decision, the Third Circuit affirmed on the basis of the
"unambiguous" terms in the deed. Additionally, the Court stated that the utilization of a new tech-
nology was "irrelevant" in light of the "absolute language of the deeds." No. 88-36, 37, slip op.
at 3-4, (3d Cir. Feb. 17, 1989).
130. No. 87-1688 (W.D. Pa., May 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
[Vol. 92
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss4/5
WAIVERS OF SUPPORT
damages. 131 In Culp, the court construed 55 severance deeds executed
in the early 1900's, which either granted or reserved the Pittsburgh
seam of coal along with waivers of support and damages. 32 The
court distilled ten separate language variations waiving support and
damages from the 55 deeds. 33 The surface and superjacent coal own-
131. While both Porter and Culp were decided in the same district, different judges presided.
Senior District Judge McCune decided Porter, Culp was decided by Judge Simmons.
132. Culp, slip op. at 2-3.
133. Id. at 3-5, 7-8. The waiver variations were as follows:
I. Together with free and uninterrupted right of way into, upon and under said land,
at such points, and in such manner as may be proper and necessary for the purpose of
draining and ventilating the mines and of digging, mining, coking and carrying away said
coal, without leaving any support for the overlying strata or surface, hereby waiving all
damages arising therefrom, or to anything therein or thereon from the removal of all said
coal ....
II. Together with free and uninterrupted right of way into, upon and under said land,
at such points, and in such manner as may be proper and necessary for the purpose of
draining and ventilating the mines, and of digging, mining, coking and carrying away the
said coal, without leaving any support for the overlying strata and without liability for any
injury which may result to the surface from the removal of all said coal; hereby waiving
all damages arising therefrom, or to anything therein or thereon by reason thereof ....
III. Together with free and uninterrupted right of way into, upon and under said
land, at such points, and in such manner as may be proper and necessary for the purpose
of digging, mining, coking, ventilating and carrying away said coal hereby waiving all dam-
ages arising therefrom or thereon or from the removal of all of the said coal ....
IV. Together with the right to mine and remove all and every part of the said coal
without being required to provide for the support of the overlying strata or surface and
without being liable for any injury to the same or to anything therein or thereon by reason
thereof....
V. Together with all the rights and privileges necessary and useful in the mining and
removing of said coal, including the right of mining the same without leaving any support
for the overlying strata and without liability for any injury which may result to the surface
from the breaking of said strata ....
VI. Together with free, uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the right of way into,
upon and under said land at such points, and in such manner as may be considered proper
and necessary for the advantageous and economical operation thereof, and in the digging
and mining of said coal; and without liability therefore, and waiving any and all damages
that might or could arise therefrom by reason of such digging, mining, coking and carrying
away all said coal, ... generally freed, clear and discharged of any servitude whatever to
the overlaying land or anything therein or thereon ....
VII. Together with free and uninterrupted right-of-way into, upon and under said
lands at such points and in such manner as may be proper and necessary to mine and
remove all and every part of said coal without being required to provide for the support
of the overlying strata or surface and without being liable in any event for any injury or
damage done to the same or to anything therein or thereon by reason thereof ....
VIII. Together with ... the full and uninterrupted right of way into, and under the
said land at such points and in such manner as may be necessary and proper for the purpose
of digging, mining and transporting said coal, and the privileges and easements necessary
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ers sought declaratory judgment that they retained support rights,
an injunction against longwall mining activities, and damages under
theories of nuisance and trespass.134 They argued that some of the
deeds did not waive support, other deeds waived support but not
damages, and that under all of the deeds the coal company was not
entitled to utilize longwall mining.
Finding that all the deeds clearly waived the right of subjacent
support, the court addressed the surface owners' contention that they
were entitled to damages for portions of their property where sup-
port had been waived. As noted above, plaintiffs owned not only
the surface, but also all superjacent coal seams. Most of the sev-
erance deeds specifically waived support and liability for both the
overlying strata and the surface. One variation of waiver language,
however, mentioned only injury to the surface. 135 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that since only damages to the surface were specifically waived,
they were entitled to damages for injury to superjacent coal seams. 136
The court characterized this argument as a misperception of the
legal nature of subjacent support. Where the right is not waived,
the subjacent owner has a duty to provide adequate support. Under
Pennsylvania law, the right to damages for removal of support de-
pends on ownership of the support estate. 37 Where the support es-
tate has been waived, however, the right upon which an action for
subsidence damages is premised no longer exists. The court found
that no particular form of language was necessary to waive support,
for the convenient draining, ventilating, depositing waste and operating the mines without
any liability for damages that may arise from the removal of all the said coal, with [sic]
leaving any support for the land above that coal ....
IX. Together with free and uninterrupted right of-way under said land, hereby waiv-
ing all damages arising therefrom to the surface or to anything thereunder or thereon, from
the removal of all of the said coal ....
X. Together with the free and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the right of way
into, upon and under said land at such points, and in such manner, as may be proper and
necessary for the advantageous and economical digging, mining, operating and carrying
away of said coal, without any liability therefore, and hereby waiving any and all damages
that might or could arise to any strata or to the surface above said coal or to anything
therein or thereon ....
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 9; see supra note 133, variation V.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 10. See also supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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but rather that "apt words" would suffice. 138 Hence, the court con-
cluded that the language "without leaving any support for the ov-
erlying strata and without liability for any injury which may result
to the surface from the breaking of said strata" employed apt words
to waive support for both the surface and the intervening strata. 139
Like the surface owners in Porter, the owners of superjacent
strata in Culp contended that the waivers of support and damage
in the severance deeds were not applicable to longwall mining tech-
nology. The owners in Culp contended this because longwall mining
did not exist and could not have been contemplated at the time of
the severance, and because longwall mining was analogous to strip
mining in its potential damages to the surface and overlying strata.
However, finding the deed language conveying the right to remove
all the coal without support for overlying interests and without li-
ability for damages to be unambiguous, the court refused to consider
extrinsic evidence supporting a different intention. The court found
as a matter of fact that subsidence would result from the removal
of all the coal whether longwall or room and pillar mining was
utilized. 40 The court noted that, between the two, longwall mining
was preferable "because it is safer, more economical, and predict-
able."1 41
Turning to the surface owners' argument that longwall mining,
like strip mining, was not a permissible technological advance under
the severance deeds, the court found that longwall, as a form of
deep mining, was fundamentally different from strip mining. 42 The
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. The court cited Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act, 52 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1406 (1987) as additional support for the proposition that a waiver of
surface damages includes damages to the strata lying between the coal seam conveyed and the surface.
Id. at 19-20 (discussing Culp v. Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., 96 Pa. Commw. 94, 506 A.2d 985
(1986); George v. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Resources, 102 Pa. Commw. 87, 517
A.2d 578 (1986) (Subsidence Act offers no protection to unimproved surface lands or superjacent
strata)).
140. Id. at 13. The court noted that upholding the plaintiffs' argument would, in effect, prohibit
longwal mining in Pennsylvania.
141. Id. The court stated that the plaintiffs' contention that longwall mining was uncontemplated
because it was unknown at the time of severance was totally baseless. Citing numerous engineering
treatises, the court found that the longwall mining technique was known in America and elsewhere
long before the turn of the century. Id. at 17-21.
142. Id. at 14.
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court construed the rule from Stewart v. Chernicky4 1 to be "not
that strip mining was disallowed, and, therefore, that full extraction
longwall mining should similarly be disallowed. Rather, it is that
what is permissible or not should, whenever possible, be derived
from the language of the instrument itself."' 144 Chernicky held that
strip mining was not permissible under a deed which, by the language
used, appeared to contemplate only underground mining. The Culp
court relied on Chernicky for the proposition that, "as compared
to deep mining, strip mining introduced a difference in kind, not
merely a difference in degree.' 1 45
In Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co.,146 the District Court for the
Western District of Virginia addressed issues similar to those raised
in Wells, Porter and Culp. The court construed a 1907 severance
deed which conveyed all the coal and waived support and damages. 47
The surface owners sought to enjoin further longwall mining by the
coal company and requested damages under counts for strict lia-
bility, negligence, emotional distress, nuisance and punitive damages.
The surface owners also sought injunctive and monetary relief under
the citizen's suit provision of the Virginia Coal Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act of 1979.148
Finding the waivers in the severance deeds to be enforceable un-
der Virginia law, the court turned to the plaintiffs' arguments that
the parties did not contemplate longwall mining at the time of sev-
erance and that, like strip mining, longwall mining was an imper-
missible advance in technology. Based on the evidence before it, the
court found that longwall mining was unknown in the area at the
time of severance. 149 Noting that Virginia had addressed the effect
of waivers of subjacent support with regard to strip mining, the
143. 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
144. Culp, No. 87-1688, slip op. at 15-16.
145. Id. at 16.
146. 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
147. Id. at 1371. The deeds granted "the right to remove all the coal and other minerals without
leaving any support for the overlying strata, and without any liability for damage which may result
from the breaking of said strata."
148. VA. CODE AwN. § 45.1-246.1 (1980).
149. 722 F. Supp. at 1372. The court noted, however, the finding in Culp that longwall mining
has been known for at least a century. Id. at 1372 n.3.
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court determined that Virginia recognized a distinct difference be-
tween strip mining and underground mining.
The surface owners relied on Phipps v. Leftwich150 to support
their argument that longwall mining was not permitted under the
deeds. In Phipps, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the parties
must have specifically contemplated strip mining before its use would
be permitted on the basis of a surface damage waiver. However, it
distinguished underground mining from strip mining on the basis
of the physical destruction of the surface attendant to strip mining
technology.15 The Virginia court stated that although strip mining
would be prohibited, the mineral owner could "take advantage of
developments in the operation of underground mines which modern
technology may make available.'1 52 Applying this dicta from Phipps,
the district court held that Virginia would allow the use of longwall
technology under severance deeds waiving subjacent support and
liability for damages.
Upon holding that the waivers were enforceable and that longwall
mining was permissible, the court determined that the only issue of
fact before it was whether the damages of which the plaintiffs com-
plained resulted from the breaking of the strata overlying the coal
seam. 53 As the evidence on causation was uncontroverted,' 54 the court
applied the waiver and entered summary judgment in the coal com-
pany's favor in all common-law claims. 55
V. LMITATIONS ON WAIVERS
Although courts generally uphold waivers against claims for sub-
sidence-related damages, some limitations on the enforceability of
150. 216 Va. 706, 222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
151. Id. at 713, 222 S.E.2d at 541; Ball, 722 F. Supp. at 1373.
152. 216 Va. at 713, 222 S.E.2d at 541.
153. Ball, 722 F. Supp. 1370. Interestingly, the deed language in Ball presented the inverse
situation from that presented by the "Category V" deed language in Culp. See note 133. Where the
Culp deed specifically mentioned damages to the surface in the waiver, and not damages to the
intervening strata, the Ball deed mentioned damages from the breaking of the overlying strata, and
did not specifically mention the surface.
154. Ball, 722 F. Supp. at 1374.
155. Id. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' statutory claim for injunctive relief on jurisdictional
grounds. The statutory claim for damages was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that their damages resulted from a violation of the Virginia Coal Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act. See id. at 1375-76.
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waivers have developed, and others may adversely impact high ex-
traction underground mining techniques. Courts have yet to apply
these limitations with any regularity, but the limitations may in the
future serve to support injunctions or the imposition of damages in
spite of clear waivers of support and liability.
A. Regulatory Limitations
The Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act of 1977156 applies
to the surface effects of underground mining as well as surface mines.
Subsidence is one such surface effect. Pursuant to SMCRA and its
state counterparts, 157 regulatory bodies may prohibit or suspend
underground mining beneath various areas upon a finding that ma-
terial damage will likely occur 158  or that imminent danger
exists. 159 These regulations would apparently apply without regard to
the contractual arrangements addressed in waivers of support and
damages.
In addition to prohibitions and suspensions of underground min-
ing beneath certain surface areas, the regulations promulgated under
ri
156. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328) [hereinafter cited as SMCRA].
157. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 allows each state to assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of
surface coal mining operations (including the surface effects of underground operations) by creating
its own regulatory program patterned after the federal program. The state program must be at least
as effective (i.e., stringent) as the federal program.
158. 30 C.F.R. §§ 817.121(d) and (e) require that:
[d] underground mining activities shall not be conducted beneath or adjacent to (1) public
buildings and facilities; (2) churches, schools, and hospitals; or (3) impoundments with a
storage capacity of 20 acre feet or more or bodies of water with a volume of 20 acre-feet
or more, unless the subsidence control plan demonstrates that subsidence will not cause
material damage to, or reduce the reasonably foreseeable use of, such features or facilities.
If the regulatory authority determines that it is necessary in order to minimize the potential
for material damage to the features or facilities described above or to any aquifer or body
of water that serves as a significant water source for any public water supply system, it
may limit the percentage of coal extracted under or adjacent thereto, (e) if subsidence causes
material damage to any of the features or facilities covered by paragraph (d) of this section,
the regulatory authority may suspend mining under or adjacent to such features or facilities
until the subsidence control plan is modified to insure prevention of further material damage
to such features or facilities.
159. 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(f) mandates that "[f] the regulatory authority shall suspend under-
ground mining activities under urbanized areas, cities, towns, and communities, and adjacent to in-
dustrial or commercial buildings, major impoundments, or perennial streams, if imminent danger is
found to inhabitants of the urbanized areas, cities, towns, or communities."
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SMCRA require mine operators to undertake remedial measures to
restore surface lands which are materially damaged by subsidence. 16°
Current federal surface owner protection regulations mandate the
restoration of surface lands, but subordinate to state law any liability
for restoration or compensation for damages to structures resulting
from subsidence. One court has approved the compulsory require-
ment to restore land as a legitimate interpretation of congressional
intent on the part of the Secretary of the Interior. 16' The Secretary
of the Interior predicated separate treatment for damage to struc-
tures on a probable impairment of contracts and the lack of a clear
congressional indication that damages to structures and facilities were
intended to be protected irrespective of state law.162
The initial version of the federal surface owner protection re-
gulations apparently required repair of or compensation for surface
structures materially damaged by subsidence without regard for the
state law. While most state programs mirror the initial regulations, 16
160. 30 C.F.R. § 817.121(c) states that:
(c) the operator shall (1) correct any material damage resulting from subsidence caused to
surface lands, to the extent technologically and economically feasible, by restoring the land
to a condition capable of maintaining the value and reasonably foreseeable uses which it
was capable of supporting before subsidence; and (2) To the extent required under applicable
provisions of State law, either correct material damage resulting from subsidence caused to
any structures or facilities by repairing the damage or compensate the owner of such struc-
tures or facilities in the full amount of the diminution in value resulting from the subsidence.
Repair of damage includes rehabilitation, restoration, or replacement of damaged structures
or facilities. Compensation may be accomplished by the purchase prior to mining of a non-
cancellable premium-prepaid insurance policy.
The phrase, "to the extent required under applicable provisions of State law" became effective Feb-
ruary 17, 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 4868 (1987).
161. National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
162. See 52 Fed. Reg. 4860 (1987). The subordination to state law of any duty to repair damage
to structures has been rejected by the D.C. District Court. National Wildlife Federation v. Lujan,
Nos. 87-1051, 87-1814, 88-2788 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1990), appeal filed April 12, 1990. In remanding
the regulation District Judge Flannery relied upon 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202(b) and 1265(b). The Judge held
that the distinction drawn by the Secretary requiring repair of the land but leaving damage to im-
provements to remedies of state law was irrational and inconsistent with congressional intent. Id.
163. Former 30 C.F.R. 817.124 stated:
(b) each person who conducts underground mining which results in subsidence that
causes material damage or reduces the value or reasonably foreseeable use of the surface
lands, shall, with respect to each surface area affected by subsidence - (1) restore, reha-
bilitate, or remove and replace each damaged structure, feature or value, promptly after
the damages suffered, to the condition it would be in if no subsidence had occurred and
restore the land to a condition capable of supporting reasonably foreseeable uses it was
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some jurisdictions have adopted language similar to the current fed-
eral regulations. 164 However, even in those jurisdictions, subsidence
related damages to structures occurring prior to the effective date
of the revised state regulation would, arguably, continue to be gov-
erned under the earlier regulation. Thus there may be a window of
potential liability for damages to structures caused by subsidence at
that time.
In Melvin v. Old Ben Co.,165 the District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois refused to enforce waivers of support and dam-
ages in the face of actions brought by the owners of damaged surface
structures. The court held that the surface owner protection regu-
lations promulgated under the Illinois permanent coal mining rec-
lamation program (patterned after the initial federal regulations)
disturbed prior state law upholding waivers of damages caused by
the removal of support. Because it construed subsequent state law
as being inconsistent with the enforcement of damage waivers, the
court refused to dismiss the surface owners' claims for relief based
on statutory provisions, negligence and willful and wanton miscon-
duct. On reconsideration, the court held that while the mine operator
was required to repair and compensate as provided by the rules and
capable of supporting before subsidence; or (2) purchase the damaged structure or feature
for its fair market, pre-subsidence value and shall promptly after subsidence occurs, to the
extent technologically and economically feasible, restore the land surface to a condition
capable of supporting the purchased structure, and other foreseeable uses it was capable
of supporting before mining .. . .; or (c) each person who conducts underground mining
activities will compensate the owner or any surface structure in the full amount of the
diminution in value resulting from subsidence, by purchase prior to mining of a non-can-
cellable, prepaid insurance policy or other means approved by the Secretary as assuring
before mining begins that payment will occur; indemnify every person with an interest in
the surface for all damages suffered as a result of the subsidence, and, to the extent tech-
nologically and economically feasible, fully restore the land to a condition capable of main-
taining reasonably foreseeable uses which it could support before subsidence.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 15440 (1979).
164. See, e.g., Virginia Coal Surface Mining Reclamation Regulations 480-03-19.817.121(c)(2);
West Virginia Surface Mine Reclamation Regulations 38 CSR 2 § 16.2(c)(2); Alabama Proposed Rule
880-X-1OD-.583(a) (Approval by Secretary of Interior pending). Some states have not yet acted to
amend their rules, despite specific statutory language mandating that the state program be no more
stringent than the federal act. See KRS § 350.069 (Ky. Supp. 1988); ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 96-1/2, para.
7901.02(c) (1985); Old Ben Coal Co. v. OSM, No. CH 6-1-PR, IBLA 88-8, (Interior Board of Land
Appeals June 23, 1989).
165. 610 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. I1. 1985), on reconsideration 612 F. Supp. 1204 (S.D. I11. 1985).
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regulations promulgated by the Department of Mines and Minerals,
the court would not enjoin it from utilizing longwall mining tech-
nology. 16
No other court has followed the lead of Melvin. However, in
Rose v. Oneida Coal Co.,167 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, while upholding waivers against common-law claims, stated
in dicta that the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation
Act may have "changed many of the old common-law rules con-
cerning the rights and remedies of surface owners vis a vis mineral
owners, [although] the dimensions of those changes are as yet un-
certain. "168 Melvin and Rose indicate that the effect of legislation
and regulation upon common-law applications of waivers of support
and damages has not been fully developed.
Another potential limitation on the applicability of support and
damage waivers is the lands unsuitable for mining provision in
SMCRA and its state counterparts.1 69 In Cogar v. Sommerville,170
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that waivers of
subjacent support created in severance deeds dated 1904 and 1914
did not waive the statutory prohibition on mining within 300 feet
of occupied dwellings. Rather, the court found the statutory lan-
guage to contemplate a specific waiver of the 300 foot requirement.
The court reasoned that a previously non-existent right could not
have been knowingly waived.171 Moreover, the court stated that "a
severance deed is to be construed in light of the conditions and
reasonable expectations of the parties at the time it is made. As a
consequence, mining methods not contemplated at the time of the
166. Melvin, 612 F. Supp. at 1205.
167. 375 SE.2d 814 fV. Va. 1988).
168. Id. at 816.
169. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). Under this statute:
... subject to valid existing rights no surface coal mining operations except those which
exist on August 3, 1977, shall be permitted- . . (5) within three hundred feet from any
occupied dwelling, unless waived by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of
any public building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or
within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
Since the phrase "surface coal mining operations" includes the surface effects of underground mining,
these prohibitions could apply to areas expected to subside.
170. 379 S.E.2d 764 fV. Va. 1989).
171. Id. at 769.
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severance deed may not be utilized. 172 To date, courts have not
regularly applied the lands suitable for mining prohibitions to the
surface areas overlying underground mines. However, future rule-
making may pose dire implications for high extraction techniques.
B. Common-Law Limitations
Aside from potential regulatory limitations on the effectiveness
of support and damage waivers, numerous cases have indicated that
willful, wanton or oppressive acts by a mineral owner will not be
protected by waivers.17 1 While few cases have found the degree of
misconduct necessary to abrogate clearly expressed waivers of sup-
port and liability, the potential for successful damage claims based
on misconduct exists. However, it is unlikely such a claim could be
based on the mere fact that a particular technology was utilized.
Rather, the misconduct would have to involve the manner in which
the operation was conducted. 74
Additionally, at least one court has interjected a rule of "rea-
sonableness" in a mining company's activities while operating pur-
suant to a clear waiver. In Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co.,17
the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the operator, and
remanded for a factual determination of whether the operator's ac-
tivity was "reasonably necessary for the production of coal in the
ordinary manner, or whether it has been caused by improper op-
erating procedures or ineffective equipment.' 1 76 The company op-
erated a preparation plant in the vicinity of a subdivision, which
subjected the surface owners to large amounts of dust. Title to the
surface tracts was derived from four severance deeds, all of which
granted the surface estate but reserved the coal, support rights and
various surface rights. One of the deeds contained a specific waiver
of damages arising from the pollution of the air or the emission of
172. Id. The court relied on earlier cases holding strip and auger mining methods to be im-
permissible mining techniques under early severance deeds.
173. See Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1982); Stamp v.
Windsor Power House Coal Co., 154 W. Va. 578, 177 S.E.2d 146 (1970); Elkhorn Coal Corp. v.
Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1952).
174. See Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1952).
175. 432 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1970).
176. Id. at 320.
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dust.17 Despite the clear language of the waiver, the court held that
the deed did not allow the deposition of "more dust than is normal
in the ordinary processing of coal. '1 78
The court found that the severance deeds, considered as a whole,
plainly showed that the company intended to create the subdivision
and intended people to live there. Hence, it found the parties did
not contemplate that the grantor could seriously impair the rights
it had granted through the emission of unnecessary dust. The court
imposed a rule of reasonableness and remanded for a determination
of whether the level of dust emitted by the company was commen-
surate with the ordinary management of the plant.17 9
Whether the fourth circuit's position in Mullins will have any
effect on actions for subsidence-related damages where waivers of
support and damages appear in the chain of title remains to be seen.
The district court in Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co.180 distinguished
Mullins on its facts, finding that the exception to the enforceability
of waivers noted in Mullins was limited to a situation where "the
face of the deed in question reveals that the contemplated use of
the surface is in conflict with the waivers of that right."' 81 However,
in Johnson v. Junior Pocahontas Coal Co., Inc. ,182 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals denied summary judgment on grounds
that the evidence might show a nuisance situation similar to that in
Mullins. The court added that the exculpatory clauses would not
shield the mine operator from all liability. Although Johnson con-
177. Id. at 317. The deed stated:
.. said party of the first part therefore excepts and reserves unto itself, its successors,
lessees and assigns the right and privilege of conducting mining operations and incidental
activities in the vicinity of the said Oakwood Subdivision and the lots hereby conveyed;
and the party of the second part. . . hereby waives and relinquishes all claims or demands
for damages . . . by reason of any such coal mining operations and incidental activities,
including but not restricted to, all claims or demands for damages arising from noise,
the pollution of air, or the emission of dust, smoke, fumes or noxious gases.
178. Id. at 319.
179. See also Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974) (rule of "rea-
sonableness" imposed upon implied waiver of surface rights as measure of "oppressiveness" where
a surface owner complained of unreasonable dust emission from preparation plant).
180. 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
181. Id. at 1372.
182. 160 W. Va. 261, 234 S.E.2d 309 (1977).
1990]
31
Gresham and Jamison: Do Waivers of Support and Damage Authorize Full Extraction Mining
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
cerned surface rights in relation to strip mining, the court clearly
indicated that expansive waiver provisions were subject to limita-
tions.'83
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have generally continued to uphold the validity of waivers
of subjacent support and liability for damages, even as to mining
operations employing longwall or other high extraction mining tech-
nologies. Courts have rejected attempts to define longwall mining
as an unknown or uncontemplated mining method and attempts to
analogize longwall mining to strip mining. This is not to say that
mineral owners whose severance deeds contain waivers of subjacent
support may mine with impunity. Some common-law limitations ex-
ist. Moreover, while not fully developed as to its effect upon waivers
of subjacent support, the Federal Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977 and its regulations may serve as significant
restrictions on waivers.
183. Id. at 270, 234 S.E.2d at 314. ("[The [waiver] clauses may not be raised as a complete
shield from all liabilities which may be indicated by evidence showing defendant's violations of rules,
regulations and laws, its wilful, wanton and reckless actions and conduct, or its creation of hazardous
or nuisance conditions .... ).
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